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Abstract
Recent research developments in common-pool resource models
emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the
presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a
recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving
feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear di⁄erential games and apply
this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where
pollution corresponds to bene￿ts and at the same time a⁄ects the
ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state-
dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system
towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algo-
rithm for calculating such taxes.
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11 Introduction
Recent developments in the study of common-pool resources embedded in
ecological systems stress the presence of thresholds, multiple steady states
and hysteresis e⁄ects, which are empirically observable features in these
ecosystems, as opposed to the traditional approach of simple linear dynam-
ics. Good examples are lakes, grasslands and coral reef systems.1 In these
systems many agents with potentially diverse objectives interact within the
ecosystem and take actions which a⁄ect its dynamic behavior and long-run
equilibrium. It follows that in the presence of complex dynamics, the socially
optimal management of these ecosystems which is attained through cooper-
ative behavior, and the characterization of outcomes under non-cooperative
behavior have to be reconsidered. The basic methodology for this must be
able to handle complex dynamics as well as strategic interaction between
users of the resource. In recent papers, Brock and Starrett (2003), M￿ler et
al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008) develop methodologies for analyzing
the socially optimal (or cooperative) and the non-cooperative outcomes of
ecosystems characterized by non-linear dynamics. In particular Kossioris et
al. (2008) derived feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) for non-linear di⁄eren-
tial games and applied this methodology to a model for lakes where pollution
a⁄ects the ecosystem services. The main result of this analysis was that the
socially optimal management solution and the best non-cooperative solution
di⁄er in terms of steady-state outcomes, paths towards the steady state and
total welfare. The FBNE outcome is inferior to the optimal management out-
come, in the sense that the steady-state accumulation of pollution is higher
and the welfare lower at the FBNE relative to the optimal management.
This result suggests that regulation is required in order to improve upon the
unregulated FBNE outcome. This however raises the methodological issue of
designing regulation of non-linear di⁄erential games. This problem has been
analyzed in M￿ler et al. (2003) for non-linear di⁄erential games with open-
loop information structure, but has not been studied, as far as we know, for
1See for example Sche⁄er (1997), Carpenter and Cottingham (1997), CrØpin (2006),
CrØpin and Lindahl (2008).
2non-linear di⁄erential games with feedback information structure.
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether optimal regulation in the
form of taxation can be designed for non-linear di⁄erential games with feed-
back information structure, which models interactions in economic-ecological
systems of common-pool resources characterized by complex dynamics. We
study optimal taxation in the sense of deriving a tax scheme which depends
on the state of the system (i.e. the stock of pollution) at each point in time
and which has the property of steering the regulated system to the socially
optimal steady state. The structure of this general state-dependent tax rate
is determined in the context of a di⁄erential game with non-linear objective,
with state dynamics characterized by convex-concave feedbacks, and with so-
lutions de￿ned in terms of non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies.
We show that the non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and the
optimal state-dependent tax should jointly satisfy a non-linear di⁄erential
equation which is derived from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equa-
tion of the dynamic programming representation of the non-linear di⁄eren-
tial game. Furthermore, we calculate, using a speci￿c algorithm, the optimal
state-dependent tax in three di⁄erent functional forms: a tax scheme with
a ￿xed rate, a tax scheme with a tax rate proportional to the state of the
system, and a tax scheme which is a quadratic function of the state. We
study this problem in detail for the non-linear state dynamic speci￿cation
corresponding to the lake problem. Benchekroun and Long (1998) studied
the optimal taxation of a polluting oligopoly using a state-dependent tax
rate, in the context of a di⁄erential game with linear dynamics and concave
objective. Their speci￿c results for the case of feedback Nash equilibria focus
on linear-quadratic problems and linear feedback strategies. In this paper we
study not only a more general problem but also a problem which represents
the non-linear dynamics characterizing common-pool resources.
2 Regulation of Non-Linear Di⁄erential Games
We consider the class of non-linear di⁄erential games studied by M￿ler et
al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008). Consider a situation where n eco-
3nomic agents take actions ai, i = 1;2;:::;n, at each point in time t, with
which they a⁄ect the state of a natural system that is shared by all the
agents. The natural system is characterized by thresholds, hysteresis, and
irreversibilities which could lead to the type of regime shifts which have been
extensively studied in lake ecosystems.2 In the context of the analysis of the
lake ecosystems, these actions would be phosphorus loadings into the lake
due to agricultural activities, while the economic agents are communities
concerned about the eutrophication of the lake that they share. The action
ai generates bene￿ts according to a strictly increasing and concave utility
function U(ai), which is assumed to be the same for all agents. The evo-





ai(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t));x(0) = x0: (1)
In the lake context the state variable x is interpreted as accumulated phos-
phorus in a lake. Besides the standard linear degradation term ￿bx, non-
linear feedbacks occur that are represented by the function f(x), which is an
increasing non-linear function of the state variable x. Following the standard
literature (e.g. M￿ler et al. 2003) the function f(x) is a convex-concave
function with a switching point in between, where f0(x) is maximal. The
stock of pollutants x causes environmental damage (or equivalently, reduces
the ￿ ow of useful services generated by the natural system) according to a
strictly increasing and convex damage function D(x), which is also assumed
to be the same for all agents. It follows that the ￿ ow of net bene￿ts accruing
to each agent at each point in time is given by U(ai(t))￿D(x(t)). Each agent
chooses a strategy ai in order to maximize the present value of net bene￿ts






￿￿t[U(ai(t)) ￿ D(x(t))]dt;i = 1;2;:::;n; (2)
2See, for example, Brock and Starrett (2003), M￿ler et al. (2003), Wagener (2003),
Dechert and O￿ Donnell (2006), Hein (2006), Kossioris et al. (2008).
4subject to (1), where ￿ > 0 is a discount rate, common for all agents.
The game aspect is standard: all actions add to the public bad, so that
each agent generates a negative externality for the other agents. Three
types of solutions are regarded as important for this game. A solution
corresponding to the socially optimal management (SOM), where strate-
gies fa1;a2;:::;ang are chosen to maximize the sum of agents￿net bene￿ts,
and two non-cooperative solutions which correspond to the open-loop Nash
equilibrium (OLNE) and the feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE). If SOM is
regarded as the socially desirable solution, deviations of the paths for the
state and the control variables for OLNE or FBNE from the corresponding
paths for SOM call for regulation. Regulation should induce the OLNE or
the FBNE of the regulated agents to converge in some well-de￿ned way to
the SOM solution.
3 Optimal Taxation in Non-Linear Di⁄eren-
tial Games
We consider the attainment of the SOM solution by a decentralized scheme
which consists of a state-dependent tax ￿ (x) on individual phosphorous load-
ings. To characterize this tax we need a description of the three solutions
described above.
The SOM solution requires choosing the set of strategies fa1;a2;:::;ang









U(ai(t)) ￿ nD(x(t))]dt; (3)









and Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle yields the necessary conditions. In
5(4), the costate variable ￿ should be interpreted as the social shadow cost
of accumulated phosphorous. Following M￿ler et al. (2003), the Modi￿ed
Hamiltonian Dynamic System (MHDS), in the state-control space (x;a), for
the optimal control problem associated with SOM is
_ x(t) = a ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t)); x(0) = x0; (5)
_ a(t) = ￿[￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]a(t) + a
2(t)2cx(t); (6)
where a denotes the total loadings of all the agents together. As it is shown
in Brock and Starrett (2003), under the assumptions made on the U(ai),
D(x) and f(x) functions, this MHDS has an odd number of steady states.
The ￿rst and the last steady states are locally stable. The locally stable
steady states have the saddle-point property with a one-dimensional globally
stable manifold, and the locally unstable steady states, with possibly complex
eigenvalues, lie between two locally stable steady states. A local socially-
optimal steady state (OSS) (x￿;a￿) is de￿ned as a solution of the system
a = bx + f(x); (7)
a =
￿ + b ￿ f0(x)
2cx
: (8)
The solution corresponding to the OLNE of this game is obtained in
a straightforward way by applying Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle to the
individual optimal control problems (2). The MHDS under symmetry in the
state-control space (x;a) is
_ x(t) = a(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t)); x(0) = x0; (9)










6de￿ned as a solution of the system
a = bx + f(x); (11)
a =
[￿ + b ￿ f0(x)]n
2cx
: (12)
OLNE-SSs have the same properties as OSSs. There are an odd number
of steady states, the ￿rst and the last steady states are locally stable with
the saddle-point property, and the locally unstable steady states lie between
two locally stable steady states. This similarity between the SOM solution
and the OLNE can easily be veri￿ed by comparing (8) and (12), which show
that the OSS is a special case of the OLNE-SS for n = 1:
Comparing the MHDSs and the steady-state conditions for SOM and
OLNE, it is clear that the two solutions di⁄er. Thus regulation is required if
the OLNE is inferior to the SOM solution and the aim is to approach the SOM
solution. As shown by M￿ler et al. (2003), the steady-state concentration of
phosphorus is higher at the OLNE-SS relative to the OSS. This calls for a
regulatory scheme which would induce the agents to choose loadings so that
the SOM solution is attained. M￿ler et al. (2003) show that in order to
obtain the loading that corresponds to SOM, the tax on loading should be
chosen such that ￿(t) = ￿￿(t)+￿
OL(t). This implies that the tax bridges the
gap between the social shadow cost of the accumulated phosphorus ￿(t) and
the private shadow cost of the accumulated phosphorus ￿
OL(t) at the OLNE,
which causes the steady-state phosphorus levels in the OLNE to exceed the
(unique) steady-state phosphorus level under optimal management. The tax
rate, however, is time-dependent, since it has to equalize cooperative and
non-cooperative loading at every point in time. M￿ler et al. (2003) studied
in detail a simpler tax scheme, consisting of a ￿xed tax rate on loading.
This ￿xed time-independent tax is called optimal steady-state tax (OSST),
and when set as ￿￿
OL = (n ￿ 1)=a￿; the regulated OLNE reaches an OLNE-
SS which is the same as the OSS, provided that the number of agents n is
su¢ ciently low.3
3For the parameter constellation used by M￿ler et al. (2003), if n > 7 then multiple
steady states occur under regulation. The attainment of the steady state which corre-
7The FBNE for the class of non-linear di⁄erential games, described by
(2), with symmetric and stationary feedback Nash equilibrium strategies
ai = h(x), i = 1;2;:::;n, can be described using Pontryagin￿ s maximum prin-
ciple and a MHDS representation or by using dynamic programming and the
resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the value function V . The
current value Hamiltonian characterizing the FBNE is given by
Hi = U(ai) ￿ D(x) + ￿
FB






the same for all i: (14)
The MHDS in the state-control space (x;a) is
_ x(t) = a(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t)); x(0) = x0; (15)
_ a(t) = ￿[￿ + b ￿ f










de￿ned as the solution of the system
a = bx + f(x); (17)
a =
[￿ + b ￿ f0(x) ￿ (n ￿ 1)h0 (x)]n
2cx
: (18)
Comparing (16),(18) with (10),(12) suggests that the OLNE is a special
case of the FBNE for h0 (x) = 0: Comparison of the conditions characterizing
SOM with the corresponding FBNE conditions suggests that regulation is
required. The Hamiltonian formulation reveals the deviations between SOM
and FBNE and the need for regulation if the FBNE is ￿ worse￿than the SOM
solution. The Hamiltonian formulation is, however, not as useful for deter-
mining the optimal tax ￿(t) = ￿￿(t)+￿
FB(t), as in the case of regulating the
OLNE. This is because it is di¢ cult to determine ￿
FB(t) due to the presence
of the unknown feedback Nash equilibrium strategies ai = h(x); which should
sponds to the OSS depends on initial conditions.
8emerge as part of the solution of the problem. In order to overcome this dif-
￿culty we choose to use the dynamic programming approach for determining
the optimal tax.
3.1 Non-linear feedback strategies and the optimal steady-
state tax
The feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the unregulated non-linear dif-
ferential game described by (2) have been recently obtained by Kossioris at
al. (2008), using the dynamic programming approach. It is shown in that
paper that for the non-linear di⁄erential game described by (2), the steady
state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is not necessarily close to the
OSS. Moreover, the paper shows that even if these steady states are close,
the value of the corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium is generally much
worse than the value of optimal management. Thus regulation is required
to approach the SOM outcome in some well-de￿ned way. In our case we
require that the regulation is implemented by a state-dependent tax on load-
ings which is designed in a way such that the regulated system attains in the
long run the desired optimal steady state of the SOM solution.
In order to study this type of regulation in the non-linear di⁄erential
game, we start with the HJB equation of each agent i for the problem without
regulation. The HJB equation for the unregulated problem is
￿V (x) = max
ai
fU(ai) ￿ D(x) + V
0(x)[ai + (n ￿ 1)h(x) ￿ bx + f(x)]g: (19)
Regulation is introduced in the form of a time-stationary tax rate per unit
loading ai which depends on the state of the system. The tax rate is de￿ned
as ￿ (x). Under the state-dependent tax the HJB equation becomes





The optimality condition is
U
0(ai) ￿ ￿ (x) + V
0(x) = 0: (21)
9In equilibrium ai = h(x), so that
V
0(x) = ￿U






By di⁄erentiating (20) with respect to x, using the optimality conditions (22)
and (23) and rearranging terms, a non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equation
in h(x), which depends on ￿ (x); is obtained:
[(nh(x) ￿ bx + f(x))U




(￿ + b ￿ f
0(x))[U
0(h(x)) ￿ ￿ (x)] + [(n ￿ 1)h(x) ￿ bx + f (x)]￿
0 (x) ￿ D
0(x):
Using the speci￿cations U (a) = lna; D(x) = cx2; f(x) = x2
x2+1, which
have been used in the lake analyses (M￿ler et al. 2003, Kossioris et al. 2008)
we obtain:
[￿h(x) ￿ (n ￿ 1)￿ (x)h





















Equation (25) is a non-linear di⁄erential equation with two unknown func-
tions h(x) and ￿ (x): If the tax function was known then (25) could be solved
for h(x); although (25) does not have an analytic solution.4 Our approach is
to specify a functional form for the state-dependent tax and then to solve for
the unknown equilibrium strategy h(x): The parameters of the tax function
are chosen such that the steady state of the SOM solution is attained as a
feedback Nash equilibrium steady state of the regulated system.
4It should be noted that the Abel di⁄erential equation of the second kind, without
an analytic solution, derived by Kossioris et al. (2008) for the unregulated problem, is a
special case of (25) for ￿ = 0:
10We consider polynomial tax functions of the general form
￿ (x) = ￿0 + ￿1x + ￿2x
2 + ::: + ￿px
p ; ￿j T 0; ; j = 0;1;:::;p: (26)
For example, if ￿j = 0;j ￿ 1, then ￿ (x) = ￿0 and we have the case of a
￿xed tax rate. If ￿0 = 0; ￿j = 0;j ￿ 2, then ￿ (x) = ￿1x and we have the
case of a tax function with a tax rate that is proportional to the current





be the vector of the parameters of the tax function.
Depending on the speci￿c structure of the tax function some of the elements
of this vector will be zero. Since ￿ is a parameter vector in (25), general
theorems on the solutions of di⁄erential equations suggest that the solution
of (25) will depend on this vector. Let h(x;￿) be such a solution. For an
initial value x = x0; the values for the feedback Nash equilibria, for each






2(t) ￿ ￿ (x(t))h(x(t);￿)]dt; (27)
where xf is a steady state and h(x;￿) is the solution of the di⁄erential








and x(t) is the solution of the di⁄erential equation
_ x(t) = nh(x(t);￿) ￿ bx(t) +
x2(t)
x2(t) + 1
;x(0) = x0: (29)
It will be clear that in general not every steady state xf can be reached from
any initial state x0 for a given ￿ (x). It will also be clear that in general
not every steady state xf will be stable. If, however, a number of stable
steady states can be reached from some initial state x0 for a given tax ￿ (x),
it is assumed that the agents will be able to coordinate on the best regulated
feedback Nash equilibrium, in the sense of attaining the maximum value (27),
11if it exists. Thus the regulator sets the tax scheme and the agents, by taking
the scheme as given, coordinate on a non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium
pro￿le h(x;￿) which converges to a steady state xf and maximizes the value
(27). This means that in this case the value will be only a function of the




where xf must be stable and reachable from x0, and where it is assumed that
the maximum exists.
Then an optimal steady-state tax function (OSSTF) can be de￿ned as
follows.
De￿nition 1 (OSSTF) Let x0 be a given initial state and let x￿ be the opti-
mal steady state which corresponds to the SOM solution. The state-dependent
tax function ￿￿ (x) for which the corresponding best regulated feedback Nash
equilibrium h￿ (x;￿
￿) generates a path that converges starting from x0 to the
FBNE-SS xf, which is equal to x￿, will be the optimal steady-state tax func-
tion. In this sense the speci￿c tax function ￿￿ (x) and the regulated feedback
strategies h￿ (x;￿
￿) reproduce the OSS of the SOM solution.
The numerical algorithm to determine the best regulated feedback Nash
equilibrium and the OSSTF for the lake problem consists of the following
steps:
Step 1. For each candidate xf and tax parameters ￿ 2 B = [0;￿
max];
the non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equation (25) with boundary condition
(28) is solved, with the ode solver ode15s of Matlab, in the intervals [p;xf]
and [xf;q], where p and q are chosen appropriately, and the h(x;￿) pro￿le
is determined.
Step 2. The numerical solution for h(x;￿) is used to solve the transition
equation (29) in the interval [0;T], where T is chosen appropriately.
Step 3. The value (27) is computed, using a Matlab quad function.
Step 4. The value is maximized over the set of admissible xf, according
to (30).
12Step5a. If the tax function corresponds to a ￿xed tax ￿0 (x) = ￿0 or to
a tax that is proportional to the current state ￿1 (x) = ￿1x (i.e. the state-
dependent tax is determined by a single parameter ￿j, j = 0 or 1), then we




, j = 0 or 1;
that determines the FBNE-SS which can be reached from a given initial state
x0 with the best regulated feedback Nash equilibrium when the tax function
is ￿0 (x) = ￿0 or ￿1 (x) = ￿1x. Since we search for a tax function that will
steer the regulated system to the SOM steady state x￿; the parameter of the






, j = 0 or 1: If x￿ is in the domain of ￿,
the OSSTF will be ￿￿
0 (x) = ￿
￿
0 or ￿￿
1 (x) = ￿
￿
1x.
Step5b. If the tax function corresponds to the quadratic function ￿2 (x) =
￿1x + ￿2x2 (i.e. the state-dependent tax is determined by the parameter
vector (￿1;￿2)), then we proceed as follows. Provided that the set of xf in
step 4 contains x￿; we construct the contour   (￿1;￿2) = x￿ which describes
combinations of the tax-function parameters (￿1;￿2) that attain the SOM















The OSSTF will be ￿￿





It is straightforward, although computationally very demanding, to de￿ne
the algorithm for tax functions with more than three parameters. If a set of
values for the parameter vector leads to the desired steady state, the regulator
chooses the element of this set that maximizes social welfare.
3.2 Numerical results
In order to be able to compare our results with the earlier results of M￿ler
et al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008), the basic parameters are ￿xed at
the same values as in these studies: b = 0:6, ￿ = 0:03, c = 1 and n = 2. For
these parameter values the saddle-point stable optimal steady state for SOM
is x￿ = 0:353, while the socially optimal steady-state phosphorous loading is
13a￿ = 0:101: Thus the open-loop OSST is ￿￿
OL = (n ￿ 1)=0:101 which means,
for example, that for n = 2 a regulated OLNE with ￿￿
OL = 1=0:101 ’ 9:9 will
converge in the long run, along the stable manifold, to the OSS x￿ = 0:353 as
shown in M￿ler et al. (2003). In order to study the structure of the optimal
tax function, for the feedback Nash equilibrium, we set the initial state at
x0 = 0:6 which is well above the OSS x￿ = 0:353, so that the OSSTF indeed
has to steer the system towards the OSS. We examine three cases for the
OSSTF, the ￿xed tax ￿0 (x) = ￿0; the proportional tax ￿1 (x) = ￿1x; and
the quadratic tax ￿2 (x) = ￿1x + ￿2x2.
3.2.1 The ￿xed tax
In ￿gure 1, the inverse of the xf = ￿(￿0) relationship described in step 5a of
the algorithm is presented.
[Figure 1]
The relationship has the expected negative slope indicating that the
higher the tax parameter, the lower the FBNE-SS. The cross in ￿gure 1
indicates the OSSTF ￿0 = 5:9 which attains the desired socially optimal
steady state x￿ = 0:353: Figure 2 presents feedback pro￿les h(x;￿0) for the
data of ￿gure 1. The dashed line corresponds to the regulated pro￿le with
￿xed tax ￿￿ = 5:9, and the value for x￿ = 0:353 is indicated by the square.
The solid line corresponds to ￿0 = 0, which means that this pro￿le corre-
sponds to the unregulated FBNE with steady state xf = 0:3825 (the value of
this pro￿le at the steady state is indicated by the circle). Both the regulated
and the unregulated steady states are stable.
[Figure 2]
Figure 3 shows the time path of the phosphorous stock under the ￿xed
tax (dashed line) towards x￿ = 0:353, along with the path corresponding to
the unregulated equilibrium (solid line) converging to xf = 0:3825.
[Figure 3]
The regulated social welfare for each player under the ￿xed tax, as de￿ned
by (31), is SWj￿0=5:9 = ￿108:018644:
143.2.2 The proportional tax
Following again step 5a of the algorithm, the proportional tax that attains
x￿ = 0:353 as a regulated steady state is ￿1 = 4:4: The xf = ￿(￿1) rela-
tionship, the regulated, and unregulated feedback pro￿les and state paths
are similar to the paths corresponding to the ￿xed tax (￿gures 1,2,3 above).
The comparison will follow below in section 3.2.4. The regulated steady
state is stable, while the regulated social welfare for each player under the
proportional tax, as de￿ned by (31), is SWj￿1=4:4 = 107:993973:
3.2.3 The quadratic tax
Following step 5b of the algorithm, ￿gure 4 shows the steady-state contours
for di⁄erent combinations of (￿1;￿2): The contour of interest is the one
corresponding to x￿ = 0:353: From the di⁄erent combinations of (￿1;￿2) on




2) = (0:9;6) is the one that maximizes




2) = ￿107:893107. This combination can therefore be
considered as the optimal quadratic tax scheme that attains x￿ = 0:353 as
the regulated steady state. The quadratic tax is an improvement in terms of
social welfare relative to the ￿xed tax and the proportional tax.
[Figure 4]
The regulated feedback pro￿le h(x;￿1;￿2) and the regulated time path
of the phosphorous stock are similar to those of the ￿xed tax while again the
regulated FBNE-SS is stable. The comparison will follow below in section
3.2.4.
3.2.4 Summary of numerical results
Our numerical results are summarized in table 1. Table 1 presents social
welfare per individual for the SOM solution, the unregulated feedback Nash
equilibrium and the regulated feedback Nash equilibrium for the ￿xed, the
proportional and the quadratic tax.
Table 1: Social Welfare
15Socially Optimal Management ￿107:227 , x￿ = 0:353
Unregulated ￿108:709334 , xf = 0:3825
Fixed tax ￿108:018644 , x￿ = 0:353
Proportional tax ￿107:993973 , x￿ = 0:353
Quadratic tax ￿107:891307 , x￿ = 0:353
Note that all the three tax schemes, by construction, induce the socially
optimal steady state but they di⁄er in terms of social welfare. The reason
is that the proportional tax moves the trajectory towards the steady state
closer to the socially optimal one than the ￿xed tax, and the quadratic tax
moves it closer than the proportional tax. The di⁄erences are small but it
can be expected that higher-order tax schemes would move the trajectory
further and decrease the gap in social welfare between the SOM solution and
the regulated feedback Nash equilibrium.
Figure 5 puts together the h(x) pro￿les for the unregulated feedback
Nash equilibrium (solid line) and for the ￿xed, linear, and quadratic tax
cases (other lines, at the right from top to bottom, respectively).
[Figure 5]
The comparison shows that for states higher than the socially optimal
steady state x￿ = 0:353, loadings decrease as we move from the ￿xed tax to
the quadratic tax. As is to be expected, unregulated loadings are the highest.
Finally, ￿gure 6 puts together the time paths of the phosphorus stock for the
cases of socially optimal management (lower solid line), unregulated feedback
Nash equilibrium (upper solid line) and regulated feedback Nash equilibria
with ￿xed, linear and quadratic taxes, respectively.
[Figure 6]
The upper path in ￿gure 6 corresponds to the unregulated feedback equi-
librium and converges to the steady state xf = 0:3825: The next three paths
(close together) correspond, starting from the top, to the ￿xed, linear, and
quadratic tax cases. All these paths converge to the socially optimal steady
state x￿ = 0:353: The lower path is the one corresponding to socially optimal
16management. We observe that the optimal management path converges very
fast to the socially optimal steady state x￿ = 0:353: convergence is almost
complete for t > 25: The regulated paths also converge to the socially op-
timal steady state, but they converge in large time, that is convergence is
almost complete for t > 2000:5 Thus the regulated paths converge to the
socially optimal steady state much slower relative to the optimal path. The
deviation between the socially optimal path and the regulated paths can be
regarded as a measure of ine¢ ciency of the speci￿c regulatory scheme to at-
tain the social optimum. This ine¢ ciency is reduced as we move from ￿xed
to quadratics taxes. It is to be expected that higher order tax schemes will
reduce this ine¢ ciency further.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper considers regulation of common-pool resources characterized by
complex dynamics. This requires solving for the feedback Nash equilibrium
of a non-linear di⁄erential game under an appropriate tax scheme. The
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for this problem leads to a complicated
ordinary di⁄erential equation that has to be solved. A numerical algorithm
is developed for a ￿xed tax, a proportional tax and a quadratic tax, and the
algorithm is applied to the model of the lake as a metaphor for this type
of models. It is shown that these tax schemes induce convergence to the
socially optimal steady state and that higher-order tax schemes lower the
gap in social welfare between the regulated feedback Nash equilibrium and
the socially optimal outcome. Further study of this problem could address
more complicated tax schemes as well as the impact on the solution from
increasing the number of agents n:
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